COMMON PROPERTY UNDER MANAGEMENT FLEXIBILITY: VALUATION, OPTIMAL EXPLOITATION, AND REGULATION by Maza, Arantza Murillas
173
Marine Resource Economics, Volume 19, pp. 173–194 0738-1360/00 $3.00 + .00
Printed in the U.S.A. All rights reserved Copyright © 2004 Marine Resources Foundation
Common Property under Management Flexibility:
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Abstract   Evidence shows that fisheries need close and careful attention be-
cause it has been observed that common property fisheries might be blamed for
at least two sources of inefficiency. On one hand, resource overexploitation; on
the other, the “static” or “passive” management applies, as outlined in the tra-
ditional fisheries literature. This paper presents a fishery model that embraces a
combination of regulatory measures, an ITQ system, and a property tax rate un-
der management flexibility. The model allows for a common property fishery to
be exploited with full economic efficiency and flexibility in contrast to the mis-
management described in the traditional literature.
Key words  Fishing resources, ITQs, management flexibility, dynamic program-
ming.
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Introduction
Experience shows that some of the major world’s fisheries management problems
are overexploitation and the uncertainties regarding the abundance of fish stocks
and resource price, among others. Fishery exploitation conditions depend on institu-
tional circumstances in general, and, in particular, on property regimes.
Concerning the overexploitation problem, Symes and Crean (1996) recognize
that overfishing is endemic in virtually all of the world’s oceans. They conclude that
despite all the evidence from more than a century of scientific investigation, the
fishing industry appears to regard the resources not simply as renewable, but also
inexhaustible. The reality is that this problem is closely linked to resource exploita-
tion conditions that depend on institutional configurations and several property
rights regimes, and seems no closer to being solved. Economists have generated ex-
tensive theoretical literature on the solutions derived under two opposite regimes,
namely open access and sole ownership (Gordon 1954; Scott 1955). There is strong
evidence that fisheries operated under a pure open-access regime until recent times.
However, in modern fisheries this regime is rare. Currently, the adoption of re-
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1 Symes (1998), Townsend (1990, 1995), Clark (1993), Grafton (1996), Eythórson (1996), Hoefnagel
(1998), National Research Council (US) (1999).
2 Clark (1976); Neher, Arnason, and Mollet (1989); Arnason (1990); Ostrom (1990); Schlager and
Ostrom (1992); Anderson (1995); Rettig (1995); Feeny, Hanna, and McEvoy (1996).
stricted access programs has generated an increasing amount of both practical expe-
rience1 and theoretical literature.2 Specifically, communal property (held by an
identifiable group of users with rights to exclude others) predominates in most of
the world’s fisheries. Continued practice of this regime will lead to suboptimal re-
source exploitation, so the tendency of any commercial fishery is towards excessive
fishing and resource overexploitation. Thus, it seems that fisheries need careful
regulation (license limitation, taxes on inputs, individual catch quotas, taxes on
catch, etc.). The “Tragedy of the Commons” (Hardin 1968) has been traditionally re-
solved by means of property taxes and individual transferable quotas (ITQs), which
are what we consider in this paper.
As stated earlier, there is a need for resolving uncertainties regarding the abun-
dance of fish stock (not only because of overexploitation, but also due to different
biological aspects) and resource price, among others. As new information becomes
available and uncertainty about future cash flows is gradually resolved, management
may have valuable flexibility to shut down and restart or even abandon the exploita-
tion of a fishery. However, fishermen have continued exploiting unprofitable and/or
exhausted fisheries because they prefer to do so rather than shut them down or aban-
don them altogether—no matter what the economic and biological conditions. That
is, they operate under “passive” or “static” management.
Note that valuation of a fishery to which management flexibility is being ap-
plied is difficult because of the high level of uncertainty attached to both the fish
stock and the output price, which will probably cause the cash flow to differ from
management’s initial expectations. Net-present-value (NPV) and other traditional
discounted cash flow (DCF) methods cannot include this management flexibility and
strategic values of a fishery properly; thus they may understate its value. This is
why the traditional fisheries literature states that fisheries operate under “static” or
“passive” management. Thus, it is necessary to devise a valuation method that can
conceptualize and quantify this management flexibility. Management options should
accommodate this kind of uncertainty. Therefore, real options theory (or, alterna-
tively, dynamic programming under risk neutrality), is applied to natural resources
to address this issue (Trigeorgis 1996).
The aim of this paper is to solve these common problems by means of an ITQ
system in a management flexibility context. With this in mind, several models are
presented. First, it begins by introducing the sole owner model of a fishery under
management flexibility whose valuation is said to be socially optimal. This model is
compared with that of the “static” management context. As evidence shows that the
communal property is even more important, the paper extends its analysis to this re-
gime. It will be shown that, as in the traditional literature, a common property
fishery exploited under management flexibility operates in a socially suboptimal
manner because the resulting shadow price is lower than that of the social problem.
Thus, the resulting fishery valuation differs from the social one, although it can be
either lower or higher, as is shown later by numerical illustration.
Given the previous results of inefficiency, here I consider an ITQ model under
management flexibility, in which a process for the ITQ price is introduced. (To my
knowledge, traditional literature has not suggested any process within a theoretical
framework, independent of the market-formation price achieved.) It is shown that
even this regulatory instrument could not generate full economic efficiency, though,Common Property under Management Flexibility 175
3 Brennan and Schwartz (1985) remarked that this kind of financial model is particularly suitable for
analyzing natural resource investment and exploitation projects where uncertain prices are a particular
concern. A real options valuation has traditionally been applied in other areas of natural resource invest-
ments since 1985 (Brennan and Schwartz 1985; Cortazar and Schwartz 1993; Cortazar, Schwartz, and
Salinas 1998; Cortazar, Schwartz, and Löwener 1998; Kemma 1993; Majd and Pindyck 1987; McDonald
and Siegel 1985, 1986; Morck, Schwartz, and Stangeland 1989; Paddock, Siegel, and Smith 1988;
Pindyck 1991; among others).
4 It could be thought that shutting down a fishery until prices or biomass recover could be very damag-
ing to fishermen. However, empirical experiences do not confirm this. Li (1998) showed that this kind
of financial model indicates that harvesting becomes more conservative and catch efficiency is raised.
With rock lobster catch and effort data from Fisheries Victoria of the Department of Natural Resources
and Environment in Australia, Li tested and compared the options model with the performance of its
conventional profit-maximizing and biological maximum sustainable yield counterparts.
as we will see, it contributes to its reduction. Symes (1998) comments that a regula-
tory system rarely rests upon the choice of a single instrument. Most management
systems embrace a complex combination of several different measures, and this idea
is linked precisely to the measure set out in this paper. It suggests that in the com-
mon property fisheries, the central authority, after having implemented an ITQ
system, must be goal oriented, choosing an efficient property tax rate on the value of
the fishery (given the economic parameters: risk free interest rate and convenience
yield). This is done to ensure the efficient exploitation of the resource for any quota
price at any point in time. Thus, both sole ownership and common property regimes
will generate full economic efficiency, so that the choice of either one may depend
more on the social rather than the economic aspect (Grafton 1996; National Re-
search Council U.S. 1999).
These objectives are tackled using dynamic programming under risk neutrality.
However, the same valuations could be obtained by means of the real options theory
(Pindyck 1991).3 Dynamic programming is chosen because it is more common in the
traditional fisheries literature. To my knowledge, these concerns about management
flexibility and management policies are being applied to the fishing resources for
the first time.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents some preliminaries
about management flexibility. The third section illustrates the Sole Ownership Case.
The fourth section extends the analysis to the problem of an individual firm exploit-
ing the fishery under the common property regime. Next, the introduction of an ITQ
system is considered, followed by a theoretical expression for the property tax rate
that ensures the efficiency of an ITQ system. A numerical illustration of the models
is then presented. Finally, the main conclusions of the paper are summarized.
Some Preliminaries about Management Flexibility
One reason that may help explain why fishery management has been incapable of
solving the problem of overexploitation (among others) over the last 50 years is
linked to “static” or “passive” management. So far, it has been observed that during
periods of low resource prices and/or low resource biomass, fishermen often con-
tinue exploiting unprofitable and/or exhausted fisheries regardless of what the
economic and biological conditions are. However, in the real world of uncertainty,
managers must alter their operating strategy by shutting down (and restarting) a
fishery as new information about the state of biomass or prices becomes available.4
Note that this policy does not imply abandoning the fishery forever; only until
stocks and/or prices recover.Maza 176
A Geometric Brownian Motion for the Spot Price
Traditional fisheries literature considers a constant resource price (“static” manage-
ment). Here, it is assumed that the firm faces a competitive market for its output,
with a spot price, s, that follows a Brownian motion (Morck, Schwartz, and
Stangeland 1989; Brennan and Schwartz 1985; among others):
ds = smdt + ssdZ, (1)
where m = local trend in the price, and may be stochastic; s = instantaneous stan-
dard deviation of the spot price, assumed to be known; dZ = increment to a standard
Gauss-Wiener process. This satisfies  dZ = e dt,  where e is a standard normal vari-
able, e ~ N(0,1).
Notice that the risk-adjusted drift term of the spot price must be:
m = r - k > 0,
where r = risk-free interest rate; K = convenience yield on holding one unit of out-
put, assumed to be proportional to the current spot price, K = ks,5 is the flow of
services accruing to the owner of the physical resource but not to the owner of a de-
rivative contract on that resource or commodity (Constantinides 1978).
The Sole Ownership Case
A fishery owner’s objective under management flexibility is not only the maximiza-
tion of the expected total discounted net revenues derived from exploitation of the
resource, but also the valuation of the option of shutting down and restarting exploi-
tation of the fishery. Given the uncertainty attached to the price of the fishing
resource, the model is resolved using dynamic programming. Thus, the sole owner’s
problem may now be stated as:





ds = s(r - k)dt + ssdZ, (3)
dX = F(X) - h(t) [ ]dt, (4)
X ³ 0, (5)
5 Brennan and Schwartz (1985), Cortazar and Schwartz (1993), Cortazar, Schwartz, and Salinas (1998)
have also adopted this assumption. k could be interpreted as an opportunity cost of delaying the fishery
exploitation, so that if k = 0 then there would be no opportunity cost and the fishery would never be
exploited. Some authors (McDonald and Siegel 1985, 1986; Lund and Øksendal 1991; Paddock, Siegel,
and Smith 1988; Bjerksund and Ekern 1990) have considered an analogous concept for k in the financial
theory; that is, a continuous dividend tax.Common Property under Management Flexibility 177
0 £ h £ h, (6)
where: q = value of the opportunity to exploit the fishery; r = discount rate (equal to
the risk-free interest rate); c(X) = total average cost function; c¢ < 0; this cost func-
tion can incorporate an opportunity cost of reallocating factors towards other
activities. l = property tax rate on the value of the fishery6 (Brennan and Schwartz
1985; Cortazar and Schwartz 1993); X = fishing resource stock; F(X) = instanta-
neous rate of growth in the fish population biomass, X; this function satisfies: F(X)
> 0; F¢(X) > <  0; F¢¢(X) < 0; h(t) = harvest rate; h  = maximum harvest rate.
Kamien and Schwartz (1991) show how the following differential equation, the
Bellman equation for the sole owner, can be derived (alternatively, the real options
theory could be applied, see Murillas 2001a):
rq = Max [s - c(X)]h - lq + qss(r - k) +
1
2








The maximization of equation (7) with respect to h requires that the following con-
dition be satisfied by the harvest rate:
s-c(X)-qX = 0. (8)
The shadow price obtained by an individual firm along the resource stock optimal
path is obtained. Several mathematical techniques can be used to determine such a
price. According to Clark (1976), we can obtain an implicit equation for the optimal
population  X f






















Alternatively, the solution for  X f
















s(t) - c(X f
*)
= r + l, (10)
where the terms on the left-hand side represent the benefits of holding a marginal
unit of the resource in situ relative to its value if harvested. These benefits are com-
posed of the increase in the expected growth rate, the change in the cost of fishing,
and the expected rate of capital gain (which appears because of the stochastic price
6 It might be thought that the fishing resources belong to fishermen (in which case l = 0) or to all the
country’s citizens (in that case l = 1). Another interpretation is also possible. In particular, l could be a
Poisson process parameter reflecting an expropriation option.Maza 178
process of the fishery resource. However, it does not appear in the traditional litera-
ture).7 Note, price changes imply that the value of the optimal stock level,  X f
*(t), is
changing regardless of its natural growth. This condition means that the benefits of hold-
ing that unit in situ must equal the discount rate. Note also that in this context, the
optimal stock level is not constant (as in the traditional literature), but time-dependent.
Remark 1.  As the marginal productivity would be lower under management flexibil-
ity than without it, the optimal resource level,  Xf
*(t), would be higher than the
traditional one, X*, for the same price. That is,  X f
* > X* . Thus, introducing flexibil-
ity involves being more protectionist from a biological point of view.
However the model is not yet complete. The valuation model must include some
boundary conditions related to both the resource price and stock. Before stating
these boundary conditions, it is convenient to distinguish between the values of the
fishery when open, v(s,X), and closed, w(s,X). Given that when the fishery is closed
both the harvest rate and the shadow price are zero, the following partial differential
equations must be satisfied:
rv = Max [s - c(X)]v - lv + vss(r - k) +
1
2


















The boundary conditions for the fishing resource price are introduced first:
(a) The value of the fishery is a continuous, smooth function of s. If v and w were
not continuous and smooth at the critical price (price at which it is optimum for a
firm to exploit the fishery),  ˆ s , one could do better by exercising at a different point:
w(ˆ s,X) = v(ˆ s,X); (13)
ws(s,X) = vs(ˆ s,X).






Some other conditions related to the resource stock are considered (although some
of them are perhaps not quite realistic).
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(c) The value of an exhausted fishery is zero:
v(s,0) = w(s,0) = 0. (15)
(d) If there is a carrying capacity of the habitat, M, then at this point the value of the
fishery cannot be increased further due to increased resource stock. This is math-




X=M = 0; (16)
¶w(s,X)
¶X
X=M = 0. (17)
(e) The fishery will be closed8 if the resource stock is less than either the optimal
resource population level,  X f
* , or the minimum biomass in the fishery, Xmin:
h(X,E) = 0, if X < Xmin < X*. (18)
Equations (2) to (18) suffice to determine the value of the fishery, q, the optimal re-
source level, X*, and the critical price,  ˆ s , policies for opening and closing the
fishery. Notice that under management flexibility not only the resource price, but
also the optimal resource level, are both stochastic. The fishery is closed [w(s,X)] if
either of them is lower than its critical value (the value w(s,X) includes the option to re-
start the fishery).9 Conversely, the fishery remains open [v(s,X)] if both are higher than
its critical value (the value v(s,X) includes the option of closing the fishery).
The Individual’s Problem in Common Property Fisheries
Let us consider the behavior of individual fishing firms within this institutional
framework.
Assumptions
(i) Each individual firm takes the other firms’ activities for granted.
(ii) Each individual firm exploits the fishery in perpetuity (Arnason 1990).
8 When a fishery must be shut down, the implications for other biologically or technologically linked
species must be taken into account. The ratio at which these species are harvested may not be the same
as the ratio of the determined maximum harvest rate  (h).  For example, if the  h  for two species were
100 tons and 70 tons, respectively, but they are landed in a 5 to 4 ratio, the total catch for the second
species would be 80 tons if the TAC for the first were achieved (Anderson 1995).
9 Although it is very difficult to monitor this kind of system, it is not a new problem. Any fishery man-
agement regime is only as good as its monitoring and enforcement system. While that extra burden may
seem costly, it is necessary to evaluate the management and enforcement system relative to those of
other types of models and relative to the potential benefits of the suggested program. Will overall moni-
toring and enforcement costs be higher or lower? Even if the costs are higher, are the benefits of the
model worthwhile?Maza 180
The Problem
By a straightforward modification of the derivation of equation (7), it can be veri-

























Remark 2.  It is apparent that private harvesting will not be optimal because the
shadow price of the fish stock determined by the individual firm,  qXf
*
i , is different
from the shadow price that the sole owner of the fishery would determine,  qXf
*. (This
is considered to be economically efficient [Scott 1955; Arnason 1990].) Note that
the individual firm does not consider the whole of the harvest rate, h*, as a part of
the marginal stock effect, only its individual harvest rate,  hi*. Since  hi* £ h* , this
means that the social shadow price of the biomass is higher than the private one for
the same X:  qX f
*
i < qX f
*.
Remark 3.  The previous result has also been obtained under traditional theory,
though it can be observed that the shadow prices are higher under management flex-
ibility (remember the analysis for the sole owner solution). Therefore, the following
relationship is satisfied:  qX*
i < qXf
*
i < qX* < qXf
* (Xi* < X f
i* < X* < X f
*). Thus, if we bear
flexible management in mind, a more protectionist biological policy is implied. Fur-
thermore,  for  the  common  property  regime  (which  gives  rise  to  serious
inefficiencies), the introduction of flexibility is even more important than for the
sole owner case.
As in the previous model for the sole owner, this fishery model includes the
boundary conditions (13) to (18).
Given the previous results of inefficiency, the next section considers that the
fishery is regulated by means of ITQs in a context of management flexibility.
The Individual’s Problem under an ITQ System
Although opinions on the question of privatization are divided among the different
disciplinary and sectorial schools of thought, some authors (e.g., Symes 1998), have
presented ITQ programs as essential and inevitable and that they are widely recog-
nized as the most successful form of fishery management to date.
The catch quota stipulates the maximum catch rate permitted for each fishing firm
at any point in time. More generally, a catch quota limits the catch volume over unspeci-
fied periods of time. An ITQ program is based on total allowable catch (TAC), which is
usually determined by biological circumstances. So, in order to increase flexibility, the
catch quotas are transferable without any constraints and are perfectly divisible. Thus,
the quotas constitute a homogeneous tradable commodity for which it is assumed that
there exists an open market for trading (Arnason 1993; Grafton 1996).
The total quota constraint may be written as: Q = Sizi, where Q represents the total
quota, and zi represents firm i’s quota (positive or negative). Furthermore, the private
harvest rate cannot be greater than the firm’s quota, hi £ zi. However, each firm maxi-
mizes its benefits if and only if hi = zi; otherwise, the firm could sell its quota.Common Property under Management Flexibility 181
A Process for ITQ Price
In this section, we propose a process for quota price obtained relative to the
privatization process of any firm and, in particular, of a fishery. This is accom-
plished in two steps (to my knowledge, traditional fisheries literature has not
proposed any process). First, it is assumed that the fishery belongs to a sole owner
who knows the value of the ”opportunity to invest” in the fishery, f (up to now, the
paper has referred to the opportunity to exploit a fishery, qi, assuming that the fish-
ermen have the property right to the fishery).10 This investment value, f, specifies
the amount to be paid for the entire fishery property right. Second, the sole owner
issues property rights in exchange for a determined price, so that anyone who pur-
chases a property right could exploit the fishery. The value of all the property rights






(1+ r)2 + ¼ + ph
1
(1+ r)n + ¼,
where p represents the quota price per ton and time period. Note that an ITQ price
reveals a “leasing right” price (Schlager and Ostrom 1992; Clark 1993; Townsend
1995; Townsend and Pooley 1995) and not a “permanent right” price. The rights are
perpetual n ® ¥ (Scott 1955, 1989; Anderson 1995; Grafton 1996), and r is assumed
to be constant. In any given period t, f would be known. Given h and r, p may be
calculated, and the discounted cash flow would equal f. The geometric distribution
of infinite terms [whose rate is 1/(1 + r)] can be expressed as: p = (f/h)r .
Remark 4.  The expression p = (f/h)r shows that the quota price depends directly on
the value of the opportunity to invest in the whole fishery and on the risk-free inter-
est rate, and inversely on the total harvest rate. As f changes with t, then p also changes.
The paper now turns to the sole owner’s valuation of the opportunity to invest in
the fishery, f. As is explained in detail in Majd and Pindyck (1987), Pindyck (1991),
and Murillas (2001a,b) among others, the value of the firm’s option to invest in the
fishery, f, can be defined as a function of the value of the opportunity to exploit it q,
f(q), where q can be defined as a function of the fishing resource stock and price.
Finally, note that when the investor exercises the investment option, the following
identity is satisfied, df(.) = dq(.).
Itô’s lemma shows how a derivative asset price changes when the underlying as-
set  price  follows  a  Brownian  motion.  Thus,  by  applying  this  lemma  the
instantaneous change in f and q is derived:
df = dq = qssm +
1
2







dt + qsssdZ; (20)
mf = mf (s,X) º qssm +
1
2








s f = s f (s,X) º qsss.
10 Every new participant can enter the fishery and exploit it after having purchased catch quotas. For
every participant, the harvest rate cannot be greater than the purchased quota. In fact, each firm maxi-
mizes its benefits if and only if they are equal.Maza 182
Expression (20) may be rewritten as:
df = mf (.)dt + s f (.)dZ. (21)
By applying Itô’s lemma, the instantaneous change in the quota price is obtained
(the drift of the price of the fishing resource, m, that appears in mp(.) is taken m = r – k,
so as to obtain a valuation under risk neutrality):









An ITQ System under Management Flexibility
Within the framework of the ITQ system, firm i’s profit maximization problem re-
quires that the following condition be satisfied by the harvest rate. The derivative is
determined by considering that: zi = hi, (Arnason 1990; Matulich and Sever 1999):
s - c(X) - p = 0. (23)
If s – c(X) > p, the firm would likely buy more quota and, conversely, if s – c(X) < p,
then the firm would likely sell. Thus, equation (23) might be understood as the in-
stantaneous quota demand function for active firms.
Comparing condition (23) with the socially optimal one represented by equation
(8), s – c(X) = qX, it is apparent that private harvesting will be optimal if and only if
p = qx. That is, if the market price for quotas equals the optimal shadow price. As the
following remark explains in detail, this could happen by sheer coincidence; so this
paper follows the traditional fisheries studies by assuming the ITQ market is dys-
functional. Nonetheless in some fisheries around the world, many of the benefits
predicted by ITQ programs have been achieved.11
Remark 5.  The price for quotas will depend on the opportunity to invest in the en-
tire fishery, f, and on the total quota supply. Therefore, on one hand, the authority in
charge must offer the total quota that, given the rest of the parameters, could assure
optimal resource use and economic efficiency. However, the volume of information
needed to accomplish this is daunting. First, the social shadow price must be calcu-
lated. This involves solving the social optimization problem. Second, the private
profit maximization problem must be solved (Arnason 1990). On the other hand, the
11 In practice, the theoretical demand function, equation (23), will differ from that achieved in the real
world. But even if there exists an open market where the quota is transferable without any constraint and
perfectly divisible, it is possible either, s – c(X) > p, when the firm would likely buy more quota, or
s – c(X) < p, when the firm would likely sell. Thus, the market formation of prices is reasonable but does
not assure optimal resource utilization. In fact, several other authors consider both (Clark, Major, and
Mollett 1989; Arnason 1990; Matulich, Mittelhammer, and Reberte 1995; Matulich and Sever 1999).Common Property under Management Flexibility 183
authority in charge could also control some parameters on which f depends to ensure
optimal utilization of the fish resources. It can be derived from Anderson (1989) that
there are effectively no fisheries in the world in which there is sufficient economic
or biological data to derive an optimal harvest time path in an ITQ context. As
Pearse (1980) noted, from an economic perspective the best that can be achieved is
the introduction of a regulation program that allows harvest to be obtained as effi-
ciently as possible. As shown below, the quota authority could determine the
appropriate property tax rate, l, that could eliminate the economic inefficiencies
once the ITQ program has been introduced. Initially, one might think this regulation
package is too complex. Symes (1998) considers that a regulatory system will rarely
rest upon the choice of a single instrument, rather it must embrace a complex combi-
nation of different measures.
An ITQ System with an Efficient Tax Rate
This section suggests an expression for this property tax rate. Remark 4 means that
the quota price, p, depends on the value of the opportunity to invest in the whole
fishery, f, determined by its sole owner, among other factors. Therefore, it is very
important to find an expression for this value. Murillas (2001a) explains, in detail,
that the equation that f must satisfy is the following:
1
2
fsss2s2 + fX F(X) - h [ ] + fss(r - k) - rf = 0. (24)
This partial differential equation does not have an analytical solution (but can be
solved numerically). Therefore, it is not possible to find a closed solution for the
property tax rate. This paper considers the case of a sustained yield harvest (the har-
vest rate equals the growth function) for which it is possible to develop a closed
solution for the property tax rate.12 For this particular case, the previous equation is
reduced to an ordinary one for which it is possible to derive an analytical solution:
1
2
fsss2s2 + fss(r - k) - rf = 0. (25)
The complete solution for this equation when the investment option is exercised
(that is, when it is optimum to invest in the fishery) is the following:
12 This optimal tax rate is being introduced to overcome not only the overexploitation problem under
common property, but also to solve the deviation of the quota market from the social shadow price after
having implemented an ITQ program, even when the ITQ problem is itself able to solve the
overexploitation problem but, cannot assure optimal economic efficiency. Deviations can be due to ei-
ther a problem of overexploitation or the wrong choice of different parameters involved in the model.
This section presents the analytical solution for this optimal tax rate in a particular case, that of a sus-
tained yield harvest because first, it is possible to obtain a model that can be resolved analytically so a
complete solution can be derived. Secondly, it is economically one of the most important cases for fish-
eries. Nowadays, one of the most important objectives of resource management is the introduction of
more conservative harvesting policies, so the concept of sustainable harvest policy is becoming increas-
ingly important. For any other general case, there exists no closed solution but it is possible to use nu-
merical methods (Amram and Kulatilaka 1999). In fact, most of the major real option-based papers use
this kind of approximation (Brennan and Schwartz 1985; Cortazar and Cassasus 1998; Cortazar and
Schwartz 1993; among others).Maza 184
f(s,X) = v(s,X) - I, (26)
where v(.) is the value of the opportunity to exploit the fishery q(s,X) when this is
open (h ¹ 0), and I is the fishery investment expenditure:







where c, d are constants. Note that the property tax rate is the only parameter under
fishery manager control, which is why it is suggested as the parameter the quota au-
thority could determine. Finally, by considering Remark 5 and using equations (26)
















+ G(s,X)l2 + U(s,X)l + Y = 0, (28)
where:
a º -s 2 + 2(r - k);
b º s2 + 2(r - k);
g(l) º s2 + 4(r2 + k2) + 4s2(r + k) - 8rk + 8s2l;












Whenever resource prices are high enough, the first term of the previous equation
becomes zero, so that it is reduced to the following quadratic equation:
G(s,X)l2 + U(s,X)l+Y = 0. (29)
A Numerical Illustration
This paper began by presenting two models; one representing the sole owner of a
fishery and one representing a private firm exploiting the fishery under common
property. It has shown that common property implies economic inefficiencies, but
do those inefficiencies imply a higher or a lower private valuation with respect to
that of the sole owner? The paper also presented an ITQ model. However, private
harvesting is not always optimal, so an interesting question is the state of private
valuation (with respect to social valuation), when the ITQ system does not eliminate
those inefficiencies. Finally, the paper introduced an efficient property tax rate, butCommon Property under Management Flexibility 185
what should it be? As the theoretical models are based on partial differential equa-
tions, it is not possible to provide a theoretical response to some of these questions.
The following numerical illustration will attempt to do so.
The Schaefer Model
So far, the model has included general functions of cost, harvest, and growth of the
resource. It is interesting to specify those functional forms so as to obtain the value
of the fishery in accordance with some known parameters. The specification, associ-
ated with Gordon (1954) and Schaefer (1957), has often been used in the study of
commercial fisheries, and thus is used here.
To illustrate the nature of the solution, a case based on Pacific yellowfin tuna
presented by Conrad and Clark (1987) is considered (table 1). However, the eco-
nomic data is hypothetical.
Social Versus Private Valuation
The social valuation is obtained from equations (2) to (18). Appendix A explains
how the private valuation can be derived in more detail.
It can be observed in tables 2 and 3 that, when the private harvest rate (hi) is
high (and the number of private firms exploiting the fishery small), the social value
of the fishery is lower than the private one. The contrary happens when the private
harvest rate is small (so the number of private firms is high). Take, for example, the
results derived for a stock of 150,000 tons. The social global value is $9,823/ton,
which is lower than the private global value when the private harvest rate is either
52,000 tons (namely $10,605/ton) or 56,000 tons ($22,540/ton). However, when the
private harvest rate is either 40,000 or 50,000 tons, the social global value is higher
than the private one ($6,177 and $8,882/ton, respectively).
The “social individual” valuations; i.e, the valuations of the delegated firms, are
observed for the same stock. Any one of the social valuations 1,637, 1,964, 2,455,
and 3,274 tons (for N = 6,5,4,3, respectively), is lower than the private one, 8,108
tons, when the harvest rate is 56,000 tons (N = 2.78). However, the contrary seems
to be true when the harvest rate is 40,000 tons. In this case, the private valuation is
1,584 tons (Ni = 3.9). Several cases for the intermediate harvests, 50,000 tons and
52,000 tons, are shown as well.
Table 1
Data for the Pacific Yellowfin Tuna Fishery
Biological Data:
Intrinsic instantaneous growth rate, g 2.6
Maximum biomass sustainable, M 250,000
Catchability coefficient, b 0.000038
Economic Data:
Risk-free rate, r 2% annual
Convenience yield, k 1% annual
Variance, s2 6% annual
Tax rate, l 5% annual
See Conrad and Clark (1987) for biological data.Maza 186
Remark 6.  Private firms do not always obtain a better valuation than the social
regulator, as it depends on the number of private firms exploiting the fishery. Thus,
in common properties a tradeoff between social and economic interests occurs, be-
cause most of the private participants may wish to be part of a common property
fishery with few firms, which could go against the social interests of some coastal
villages.
Individual Valuation under an ITQ System
See Appendix B for an explanation of how this valuation is derived. Table 4 has
been constructed for a private harvest rate of 55,000 tons—higher than the social
one, 27,300 tons—and for 2.5 private firms, lower than the number of delegated
firms belonging to the sole owner, 5.
Table 4 shows the price of the fishing resource, s. For every price, the second
column shows the value of the opportunity of exploiting the fishery obtained by the sole
owner for each of its delegated firms (see social valuation). The next column shows the
social shadow price values. The last four columns show the value of the opportunity
to exploit the fishery obtained by a private firm for different quota prices.
Take, for example, the row for s = $1,400/ton. For this price, the sole owner
fishery value is $3,538/ton (for each of its delegated firms). This valuation is differ-
Table 3
Value of the Fishery ($/ton) by a Private Firm under Common Property
Ni  qi   qi Ni
Stock hi = 40,000 hi = 50,000 hi = 52,000 hi = 56,000
100,000 3.9 1,562 6,091 3.12 2,720 8,486 3.00 3,376 10,128 2.78 7,591 21,146
125,000 4.0 1,638 6,650 3.25 2,901 9,428 3.12 3,591 11,203 2.90 8,121 23,550
150,000 3.9 1,584 6,177 3.12 2,847 8,882 3.00 3,535 10,605 2.78 8,108 22,540
175,000 3.4 1,342 4,576 2.73 2,480 6,770 2.62 3,106 8,153 2.43 7,288 17,709
200,000 2.6 1,197 3,112 2.08 2,338 4,863 2.00 2,971 5,942 1.85 7,219 13,355
Table 2
“Social” Value ($/ton) of the Opportunity to Exploit the Fishery for s = $1,000/ton
Stock Stock Stock Stock Stock
100,000 125,000 150,000 175,000 200,000
q 6,862 8,333 9,823 10,884 11,661
Number of Firms q/N
6 1,143 1,397 1,637 1,814 1,943
5 1,372 1,676 1,964 2,177 2,332
4 1,715 2,095 2,455 2,721 2,915
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ent from the one obtained by the individual firms. For a given quota price of $300/
ton (a quota price lower than the social shadow price, $1,024/ton), the valuation is
$2,251/ton, lower than the social one ($3,538/ton). Further, as the quota price ap-
proaches the social shadow price, the individual valuation also approaches the social
one. As quota price ranges from $300 to $900/ton, the value ranges from $2,251 to
$3,538/ton.
Remark 7.  Although this ITQ program does not generate full economic efficiency, it
does contribute towards curbing the inefficiencies inasmuch as the quota price tends
towards the social shadow price, as does the exploitation value. Thus, it is important
to point out that under an ITQ system, overexploitation (or, similarly, the determina-
tion of a quota price lower than the social shadow price) is not the private firm’s
best operating policy if it wants to increase its valuation.
Efficient Property Tax Rate Valuation
As has been noted, a quota system cannot be isolated from external means of deter-
mining each year’s TAC. Neither can they neglect other aspects, such as the
determination of an efficient property tax rate (Scott 1989). The nature of this tax is
analyzed below for the particular case of a sustained yield by applying equation
(28).
At this point, it is useful to remember that the investment value, f, can be ob-
tained by using either dynamic programming or the real options theory, which is
why it is possible to use some results of the financial options theory (see note 3 for
more details) to obtain an interesting interpretation of the results. Merton (1973) ex-
plains how this value, f, can be separated into two others: the “intrinsic value” and a
“temporary value” (figure 1). The intrinsic value can be defined as the shadow price,
s-c(X). The temporary value depends on the investor’s expectations and can be de-
fined as the difference between the investment value, f, and the intrinsic value.
Table 4
Value of the Fishery by a Private Firm under an ITQ System
Private Firm, qi
Sole Owner Quota Price, p
Resource
Price, s q qx 300 600 900 1,200
1,000 2,177 624 1,590 ____ ____ ____
1,100 2,519 724 1,755 2,250 ____ ____
1,200 2,860 824 1,920 2,415 ____ ____
1,300 3,199 924 2,086 2,579 ____ ____
1,400 3,538 1,024 2,251 2,744 3,238 ____
1,500 3,876 1,124 2,417 2,908 3,402 ____
1,600 4,213 1,224 2,583 3,073 3,566 ____
1,700 4,549 1,324 2,748 3,238 3,730 4,225
1,800 4,886 1,424 2,914 3,403 3,895 4,389
1,900 5,222 1,524 3,080 3,569 4,060 4,553
2,000 5,557 1,624 3,246 3,734 4,225 4,718Maza 188
Remark 8.  The purpose of the property tax rate is to match the quota price with the
shadow price in order to reduce the “temporary value.”
Thus, as can be observed in table 5:
(i) The higher the expected growth of the resource price (r – k), the higher the
investment opportunity, f, and the temporary value thus the higher the
property tax rate. Take for example a price of $1,000/ton. The higher the
expected growth (0.01, 0.015, and 0.02), the higher the tax rate (1.125, 1.672,
and 2.237, respectively).
(ii) The higher the resource price, the lower the temporary value; thus, the lower
the property tax rate. For an expected growth (r – k) of 1% (2% – 1%): the
higher the resource price (from $1,000 to $1,100/ton for example), the lower
the tax rate (from 1.125 to 1.097, respectively).
Furthermore, Murillas (2001a) shows that the higher the risk-free rate and the
lower the convenience yield are, the higher the “temporary value.” On the other
hand, the lower the resource price, the higher the “temporary value.”
However, it can be seen that the property tax rate sensitivity to the resource
price, s, is small. This suggests that the central authority must pay closer attention to
the risk-free interest rate and the convenience yield than to the resource price in or-
der to determine and modify the efficient tax rate.
Concluding Remarks
Experience shows that up to now, many important aquatic stocks of commercial in-
terest have been depleted and that most of the remaining stocks continue to be
exploited under poor management. Thus, it is evident that the future of fisheries de-
pends on better management that is closely linked to fishermen’s behavior.
Fishermen seem to ignore the problems of the fisheries because individual firms
overexploit fisheries systematically, assuming that this is the best operating policy.
They continue exploiting unprofitable and/or exhausted fisheries (when the resource
Figure 1. Value of the Sole Owner’s Option to Invest in the FisheryCommon Property under Management Flexibility 189
price and/or the resource stock are too low) because they are operating under
“static” or “passive” management.
With the aim of suggesting improved management procedures for fisheries, this
paper analyzes the possibility of exploiting a common property fishery under man-
agement flexibility (which permits the valuation not only of the maximization of the
expected total discounted net revenues derived from exploitation, but also the valua-
tion of the option to shut down and restart the exploitation of the fishery). What is
determined is that private harvesting will not be optimal because the shadow price is
different from the social shadow price (decided by the sole owner). However, man-
agement with flexibility implies being more protectionist with the resource stock;
therefore, its introduction is much more important in a common regime than for the
sole owner case. A numerical illustration shows that if the private harvest rate is
high (and the number of firms exploiting the fishery small), the private valuation is
higher than the social valuation. However, the contrary occurs if the private harvest
is small. Thus in common properties, a tradeoff between the social and economic in-
terests appears, as most of the private participants would wish to be part of a
common property fishery with few firms. However, this could go against the social
interests of some coastal villages. The fishery regulator must take into account the
social situation of a very large number of coastal villages that depend on fishing.
The few-firm system may not be in the interest of these villages.
In order to reduce this regime’s inefficiencies, it has been regulated by means of
individual catch quotas. It is shown that although a common property fishery under
an inefficient ITQ program (that is, if the private shadow price is lower than the so-
cial shadow price) does not generate a “first-best” result, the ITQ program
contributes towards the elimination of these inefficiencies as the quota price ap-
proaches the social shadow price. We can now turn to the valuations. The private
firm’s valuation is lower than the social one. However, the lower the difference be-
tween the private quota price and the social shadow price, the lower the difference
between both values. Note that in contrast to the usual private behavior under a
quota regulation, overexploitation is not the firm’s best operating policy, so fisher-
men cannot ignore it if they do not want to reduce the value of the fishery.
In efficiency terms, it appears that it is not possible to find a common property
regime solution as good as the sole owner one. This implies an important concern
for fishery managers, because empirical evidence shows that common property is
Table 5
Value of the Tax Rate, l
Tax, l(%)
Resource Shadow r = 2% r = 2% r = 3%
Price Price k = 1% k = 0.5% k = 1%
1,000 624 1.125 1.672 2.237
1,100 724 1.097 1.639 2.223
1,200 824 1.084 1.621 2.221
1,300 924 1.080 1.613 2.221
1,400 1,024 1.080 1.612 2.216
1,500 1,124 1.080 1.612 2.210
1,600 1,224 1.079 1.611 2.204
2,000 1,624 1.072 1.602 2.177
Note: X = 175,000; h = F(X) = 136,500; i = 28,000,000.Maza 190
predominant in most of the world’s fisheries. For this reason, this paper suggests an
economically efficient ITQ system able to match the sole owner solution.
As has been shown, unless the quota price equals the social shadow price, the
central authority must remain efficiency oriented after implementation of the ITQ
program. The question is what this authority may control, given that most of the
model parameters are determined by the economic markets. Traditional literature
has tried to offer the total quota that could ensure efficiency, but the results have
been unsuccessful to date. This paper suggests that the authority could determine the
efficient property tax, l, at each time point given the economic parameters (conve-
nience yield and risk-free interest rate). It is shown that the higher the resource price
and the lower its drift term, the lower the property tax rate. Thus, the role of this tax
rate is to reduce the “temporary value” of an option (that is, the option investment
value that depends on the fishermen’s expectations).
Finally, when a central authority is considering a regulatory instrument, it must
not choose among them, rather apply a combination of several instruments. Al-
though this could be complicated, it is better than leaving fisheries exhausted and
poorly managed.
This paper has several limitations, which in turn, signal the way to further ex-
tensions. For instance, the assumption on the risk-neutral valuation. It may be
interesting to see if the model results would stand up to the incorporation of risk
aversion. Moreover, the paper has assumed the existence of a risk-free interest rate,
but an important question may be concerning its relaxation. It might be helpful to
try to extend the present results beyond what is implied by the standard real option
theory.
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ds = s(r - k)dt + ssdZ; (A2)
dX =[F(X)-h(t)]dt; (A3)
X ³ 0; (A4)
0 £ hi £ h
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where Ni = number of private firms that exploit the common property fishery; hi =
private harvest rate;  h
i
= private harvesting constraint. Biological concerns for the
current size of the fish stock and how it will change over time are addressed by lim-
iting the total amount of annual fishing mortality. This TAC is exogenously set by a
central authority (some authors refer to it as a quota authority) that may allocate
quotas to firms through the quota market until the sum of individual quotas consti-
tutes the total supply quota.
The solution to the problem includes the conditions:
rqi = Max (s - c(X)hi - lqi + qs












s - c(X) - qX
i = 0. (A7)
The illustration is for the sustained yield harvest, so that:
hiNi = F(X)= h.Maza 194
Furthermore, note that the following relationships are satisfied (see Remark 3):
hi > h / N, Ni < N.
The private firm solves equation (A6). This is a partial differential equation
with no analytic solution, though it is straightforward to solve numerically. There
are two numerical procedures that may be used when exact formulas are not avail-
able. The first one involves Monte Carlo simulation (Hull 1997) and the binomial
method (Hull 1997; Teisberg 1994). The second procedure involves the use of finite
difference methods (Cortazar, Schwartz, and Löwener 1998; Brennan and Schwartz
1978; Geske and Shastri 1985; Hull and White 1990; Majd and Pindyck 1987). In
this paper, a numerical implementation of the implicit finite difference method is
adopted. This method is used, as opposed to the explicit finite difference method,
because of its robustness and superior stability properties (Geske and Shastri 1985).
Appendix B
Individual Problem under an ITQ Program
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The solution to the problem includes the condition:
rqi = Max
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